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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Plato's Republic. Edited with Notes and Essays by the late B. JOWETT and LEWIS CAMPBELL. Vol. I. Text. Vol. II. Essays. Vol. III. Notes. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1894.

The history of this edition, as recounted in Professor Campbell's preface, is exceedingly interesting. It was originally undertaken by Professor Jowett about the year 1855 for the series in which Professor Campbell's editions of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman appeared. Diverted from his task by the publication of Essays and Reviews, Professor Jowett returned to it in 1863, only to conceive the design of a translation first of the Republic and then of all the Platonic dialogues, which occupied him until 1871 and was followed by his translations of Thucydides and the Politics of Aristotle. The commentary on the Republic was never wholly abandoned, however, but had been gradually brought to completion and copied out, when in 1875 Professor Campbell was taken into partnership by the author. During the ensuing 18 years a text was adopted, and the commentary, after repeated revisions, by each of the editors, was made ready for its final transcription. But before the work could be published, Professor Jowett died, solemnly commending to his associate the completion of the undertaking which had occupied him at intervals for forty years.

Is the result proportionate to all this labor, to the expectations aroused by the association of two such names, and, if the sordid suggestion may be pardoned, to the ten dollars which these three sumptuous volumes demand from the scholar's scanty purse? It would be ungracious, in view of all that is here offered us, to press these questions. And yet one must confess to a slight sense of dissatisfaction. The work is too costly and ponderous to meet the long-felt want of a convenient textbook for college classes, and despite its many excellencies, the scholar and historian of thought cannot feel that it is a definitive and monumentally 'exacted' achievement, when they compare it with Munro's Lucretius or with Jebb's Sophocles.

One naturally turns first to the essays. It would be unfair to insist on a certain feeling of disappointment that accompanied their first perusal. The announcement that the Jowett and Campbell Republic would include a volume of essays led us to expect a series of studies embodying the life-long reflections of the master on the great work which had preoccupied his attention for so many years—philosophical studies that should bring out the relation of the speculations of the Republic to Hellenic and to universal ethics and politics, historical studies that should trace in some detail the unparalleled influence that this book has exercised through the ages on the minds of thoughtful men. But the successive postponements of this edition to other tasks, till the work was finally interrupted by death, have reduced Professor

Jowett's contribution to one slight essay 'On the Text of Greek Authors,' and it is no disparagement of the useful and interesting studies with which Professor Campbell has filled the breach to say that they do not quite meet the measure of those earlier anticipations.

What can be said of Professor Jowett's entertaining essay 'On the Text of Greek Authors'? It is a strong plea for conservatism in the admission into the text of readings unwarranted by good manuscript authority, a subtle and impressive statement of the inherent limitations of human faculty in divinatory criticism, a vigorous warning against the extravagances of conjectural emendation and the futilities of collations of the punctuation and spelling of third-rate manuscripts. It is interesting reading for the scholar, and would be instructive though somewhat misleading to the tiro. Here and there it offers one of those sage *sententiae* with which the master never failed to adorn any subject he touched; e. g. "An art or kind of knowledge which is attractive and at the same time wanting in certain tests of truth is always liable to fall into the hands of projectors and inventors"; or this: "A labour which is wholly disproportioned to the result is apt to infect the judgment and to pervert the wider comparison of other branches of knowledge, which is the safeguard against the errors of exclusive study." It is stimulating, suggestive and useful as a corrective to extreme views. But its scientific value for practical guidance is *nil*. For the admissibility of any given proposed emendation is a matter of particular probability slightly affected by plausible generalities or analogies derived from the blunders of Bentley or the difficulties of emending Shakspeare, but hinging on niceties of Greek scholarship with which Professor Jowett's acquaintance remained imperfect to the end.

Professor Campbell's first essay is a rather loose and rambling study of the structure of the Republic and its relation to other dialogues. He begins with an enumeration of the main subdivisions of the Republic as indicated by Plato himself, and a brief résumé, allusive rather than lucidly expository, of the plot. He then takes up and refutes Krohn's view that the metaphysical digression in books V-VIII was composed later than the Socratic books I-IV and VIII-X, and inserted with junctures which the Teutonic critical eye can still detect. I do not propose to take this controversy seriously. Common sense tells us that the Republic was a long time composing, and may have been often interpolated and revised by Plato before his death. Those who have a competent intelligence of Plato's thought know that, while his moods and the stress of emphasis laid on particular aspects of truth varied at different periods of his life, there are few, if any, important Platonic conceptions of which distinct traces cannot be found in the Republic. The essential unity of the Republic is best brought out by a positive exposition of its central thought, such as I have attempted elsewhere. The possibilities of misinterpreting Plato are infinite. It is idle to try to lop off the Hydra heads of ingenious misapprehension by controversy. The remedy lies in broader philosophic and literary culture and in closer study of text and context. For the rest, the opinions concerning the Platonic philosophy of a critic who (like Krohn) maintains that the Republic is the earliest genuine extant dialogue may be safely disregarded.

Professor Campbell's remarks on the unity of the Republic are sensible and convincing. I fail to see the point, however, of his concession (p. 8): "nor in

the series *νοῦς διάνοια πίστις εἰκασία* is there any recognition of the other series *νοῦς θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*." What of it? One might as well observe that in Sully's Psychology the series cognition, feeling, will contains no recognition of the series reasoning, judgment, imagination, sensation. If a connecting link is needed, however, Phaedo 83 C D supplies it. Plato held that pleasure, pain and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) constrain mankind to take their objects, the objects of *πίστις* and *εἰκασία*, for the primary realities. Professor Campbell's suggestion that *ἐμπεπτώκαμεν* (IV 435 C) and *διανευέκαμεν* (441 C) are anticipations of the image of the wave in the disputed books is, I think, fanciful. They are unconscious anticipations, at the best, and prove nothing as to date of composition.

By way of supplement to this discussion, Professor Campbell takes up the interpretation of the allegory of the cave at the beginning of book VII. Many of his isolated remarks are of interest. But he has not grasped the main clue—the truth that the Idea of Good is not primarily an ontological but an ethical conception, and that it is therefore idle to bring it into relation with an assumed ontological scale of the ideas. Not recognizing this, he falls into the usual error with regard to Plato's mathematical illustrations, and fails to perceive, although it is explicitly affirmed by Plato, that the intermediate place occupied by mathematical conceptions here is in the educational and propaedeutic, not in the absolute ontological, scale. As I have elsewhere illustrated this point more fully, I will here confine myself to another but kindred topic. Professor Campbell, like many others, finds difficulty in reconciling the ontology of book X with the "more advanced ontology" of books VI and VII, and thinks (p. 27) that the clear conception of Being, etc., "as ideas of relation which comes out at Theaetetus 184, 185 could hardly have been possible while Plato held the doctrine of ideas in the crude and undeveloped form which is still implied in the Republic, and which the Parmenides for the first time showed to be unsatisfactory." But I am unable to find any thought in the Parmenides not distinctly foreshadowed in the Republic. In both dialogues it is a postulate of dialectical method that every conceptual unit of thought expressed or capable of expression by a general term should be an absolute 'idea,' whether it represent a relation, a 'natural kind,' an ethical ideal, a manufactured, or a mean and sordid object. In both it is recognized that this is a hard doctrine, involving us in modes of speech that strike harshly on unaccustomed ears, and, when we attempt to crystallize it into ontology, in paradoxes and antinomies. More particularly the seeming incompatibility of the absolute unity of the ideas with their intercommunion (1) with concrete things, (2) with each other, is expressly remarked upon in the Republic. The famous argument of the 'third man' which is supposed to mark the 'crisis' of the Parmenides and the necessity for a reconstitution of the doctrine of ideas is explicitly stated in the tenth book of the Republic. What other interpretation is it possible to put upon the words (597 C) *ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπὶν μὴ πλεον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἐστι κλίνη· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὐτε ἐφντεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φῶσιν. Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη. 'Οτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσεις, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἥς ἐκείναι ἂν αὐ ἀμφοτέραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἐστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο? Compare*

with this Parmenides 132 E: οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τι τῷ εἶδει ὁμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος κτλ. I do not see how it is possible, after attention has been called to these passages, for scholars to affirm that the discovery of the argument of the 'third man' drove Plato to a revision of the entire doctrine of ideas. Lastly, there are at least two passages in the Republic which contain the germ of all the antinomies of the Parmenides concerning the one. (1) The passage in 436 E where such quibbling ambiguities are anticipated in a tone of weary familiarity and deprecated, and (2) the passage on ideal numbers, 526 A: περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἶον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ μικρὸν διαφέρον, μούριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν. With which compare, e. g., Parmenides 159 C: οὐδὲ μὴν μούριά γε ἔχειν φημὲν τὸ ὥς ἀληθῶς ἐν. The Parmenides, then, is simply the attempt to sum up once for all, in compact, symmetrical form, those inherent ambiguities of language or ultimate ἀπορίαι of metaphysics which Plato was always aware of, but which he chose merely to indicate and dismiss when engaged in predominantly ethical or sociological discussions.

Professor Campbell's discussion of the relation of the Republic to the other Platonic dialogues, the most important topic of which has just been considered, makes no claim to system or completeness. The analogies between the Gorgias and the Republic are clearly, though not very subtly, indicated. But surely it is over-refining to quote the playful remark σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν, γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς (Gorg. 508 A) as evidence that "the Gorgias also agrees with the Republic in assigning an intellectual or scientific basis for morality" (p. 22). The discussion of the relation of the Republic to the Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist is vitiated, as I have said, by Professor Campbell's failure, in common with many other critics, to grasp the simple meaning of the doctrine of ideas. He sees in the concluding passage of Republic VI an ascending scale to an absolute ἀνυπόθετον, instead of a dialectical method of coordinating all ethical and social conceptions by the systematic regression on the part of disciplined minds to some ideal of good and happiness postulated as final. The image, frequent throughout Plato and Aristotle, by which the universal is spoken of as a whole and its subordinated species or concretes as parts, presents a serious problem of ontology to him. He asks whether the ideas are Forms of Thought and the higher related to the lower as the Ideas of the Reason to the Categories of the Understanding, with no apparent recognition of the utter irrelevancy to Plato's real thought of the decorative Kantian literary analogies, or of the fact that the best modern thought regards these distinctions as purely artificial, and is therefore pleased not to find them in Plato. He says that Plato is nowhere distinctly conscious of the difference between a genus and a category, but has not entertained the thought that Plato's freedom from futile distinctions which ultimate psychological analysis cannot verify is one of his chief titles to honor.

This essay is supplemented by a long and interesting excursus in which Professor Campbell sums up, not without legitimate complacency, the cumulative evidence brought by the statistics of Dittenberger, Schanz, Ritter and others in support of the position defended, against Stallbaum and Zeller, in his editions of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, that these dialogues,

together with the Philebus and the Parmenides, form a group later than the Republic and intermediate between it and the Laws.

Essay II on the text may be considered later. The essay 'On Plato's Use of Language' fills nearly 200 pages. Nothing beyond a brief characterization of it can be attempted here. A short, well-written introduction brings out one of the distinctive features of Plato's style as a whole, the peculiar combination it presents of conversational liveliness and freedom with punctilious dialectical precision. Then follows a long chapter in grammar constructed much on the lines of the Introductory Essay on Language in Professor Campbell's *Sophocles*. It is a convenient, though not exhaustive nor especially illuminating, presentation of the more notable peculiarities of Plato's syntax and idiom. The material is in the main a résumé of the grammatical notes in the commentary supplemented from Riddell's *Digest* and Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*. The present reviewer is incompetent to discuss it in detail, as he has never been able to comprehend the infinite gusto with which Greek scholars discuss and record for the hundredth time, with individual innovations of terminology, the 'aorist of the immediate past,' the 'philosophic imperfect,' the 'perfect of fixed habit,' the 'assimilated optative,' the 'expegetic infinitive,' the 'inner accusative,' the 'dative of the person interested,' the 'predicative adverb,' and other familiar syntactical specimens which to his duller sense have been sufficiently embalmed or stuffed and set up for inspection once for all in the indispensable collections of Kühner and Goodwin. Exhaustive historical statistic such as laborious Germany gives us, the delicate observation of neglected niceties of usage such as we find in the notes of Prof. Jebb's *Sophocles*, the penetrating analysis of conventional syntactical categories for which we look to Professor Gildersleeve,—these are different matters. But the miscellaneous yet incomplete collections of familiar constructions and idioms with which so many editions of the classics are now introduced merely dishabituate the student to the intelligent consultation of his grammar.

These strictures apply only in part to the essay before us. The treatment of the particles offers much which the student could extract from his grammar or lexicon only with difficulty and by inference, if at all. And the section on imperfect constructions, changes of construction and anacoluthon will greatly lighten the task of the teacher of the Republic.

Part II, *Platonic Diction*, begins with a laborious, though necessarily incomplete, study of Plato's vocabulary. Tables constructed like those in Schmid's *Atticismus* are given of Plato's new derivatives or compounds, with appended citation from Stephanus of the authors (without chapter and verse) who employed them after Plato. These are followed by columns of vernacular words (partially illustrated from Aristophanes and the older comedy), of picturesque terms borrowed or imitated from poetry, of philosophic metaphors and of etymological puns. Such collections are interesting and suggestive, but they prove nothing that Macaulay's scholar would not learn in a far more natural way by "reading Plato with his feet on the fender" for a day or two, and they are not exact or complete enough to supply a basis for a final treatment of Plato's style. Lastly we have a section on Plato's philosophical terms, subdivided into metaphysical, psychological and dialectical words. It

is not really possible to expound the terminology of a thinker like Plato apart from the systematic analysis of his philosophy or of some portion of it. For his terms take their meaning from the context, and the possibilities of misapprehension when they are studied in isolation are infinite. With this reservation, Professor Campbell's somewhat desultory observations will be found helpful. I fear, however, that in the eleven pages devoted to *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* the student will be unable to see the wood for the trees. Why not say at once that *εἶδος* means (1) concretely the 'look' of a thing, the typical aspect, "the look that expresses a single meaning of nature" (Martineau), or (2) abstractly the hypostatic objective reality postulated as underlying every general term or conceptual unit, or (3) the logical class or genus, or (4) any shade between these meanings?

The discussion of *εἶναι*, *ὄν*, *οὐσία*, etc., is superior to that found in Peipers' *Ontologia Platonica* in that it fills two pages instead of two hundred. A tacit refutation follows (but this is slaying the slain) of Mr. Jackson's 'Later Theory of Ideas' in the guise of a review of Plato's indiscriminate employment, at all periods, of the manifold terms for 'assimilation to' or 'participation' in the ideas. The footnote on p. 313 is an excellent illustration of the misconceptions that are likely to arise when Platonic passages are taken in falsifying isolation. It runs: "In Parm. 133 D there are two stages in the descent from the ideas to individuals, (1) *ὁμοιώσεις*, subsisting between the idea and its *ὁμοίωμα* or concrete type, and (2) *μέθεξις τοῦ ὁμοιώματος*." A literal and mechanical interpretation of the passage referred to would seem to confirm this interpretation. It would, nevertheless, seriously mislead the student. Parmenides is arguing that, in the case of relative terms, ideal relatives will correlate only with ideal relatives and concretes only with concretes. Jones is (slave) of Smith. Smith is (master) of Jones. But Jones has no relation to master in the abstract (ideal), nor has Smith to the abstract or ideal slave. The expression of the thought is rendered more vivid by the personification inherent in Greek style. Absolute *δεσποτεία* is in heaven and has no communication with the *δεσποτεία παρ' ἡμῖν*. In this last statement the necessities of language have driven Plato into apparent contradiction. His hypothesis is not really stateable in language. It is impossible, as the *ῥέοντες* of the Theaetetus are admonished, to banish general terms from the most concrete forms of expression. The statement 'Smith is (master) of Jones' not only affirms a relation between the concretes Jones and Smith, but predicates the general term 'master' of Smith, or in Platonic languages makes Smith participate in (*μετέχειν*) *δεσποτεία*. But this, on the present hypothesis, necessitates a doubling of *δεσποτεία*, since ideal *δεσποτεία* stands aloof in incommunicable isolation. It is a mistake to crystallize into rigid metaphysical dogma this concession to the exigencies of language. But no critic who possesses a sense of humor will care to run down and analyze in this pedantic fashion many such misconceptions. Plato can be rightly interpreted only by a positive systematic exposition of his thought, with its entire logical and emotional setting.

Professor Campbell's remarks on the 'psychological' terms *αἰσθησις*, *φαντασία*, *διάνοια*, etc., require no comment. The discussion of *ὑπόθεσις* under dialectical terms seems to owe a debt to the note on *Συλλογισμοὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* in A. J. P.

X 4. Professor Campbell has apparently changed his mind with regard to Theaetetus. 157 B C: ὃ δὲ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπίν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶν τε καὶ εἶδος. In his edition of the Theaetetus he prefers to understand the ἀθροίσμα of the union of many predicates in the universal. Here (p. 337) he takes it to mean that "each substance is a bundle or aggregate of transient attributes or presentations." A passage in Sextus Empiricus (p. 457, Bekker) favors this latter interpretation: εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ τι ὅλον οἷον ἀνθρώπος ἵππος φυτόν ναῦς (ταῦτα γὰρ ὅλων ὀνόματα) ἤτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν νοεῖται, ἢ τὸ ἀθροίσμα τῶν μερῶν λέγεται τυγχάνειν ὅλον.

The text of this edition was originally based on that of Baiter's edition of 1881, but has been gradually revised into closer conformity with the text of Hermann. The various readings given in the footnotes are taken mainly from Paris. A, which Professor Campbell has recollated himself, and from which he has gleaned a number of hitherto unnoticed details; Venetus II, collated with Bekker's text for the purposes of this edition by Professor C. Castellani, of the Library of St. Mark, and Cesenas M, collated for this edition by Professor Enrico Rostagno.

Professor Campbell's laborious essay on the text begins with a description of the chief manuscripts. This is followed by an elaborate argument based on the agreements and divergencies of M, A and II, in support of the position that M is the best of the inferior MSS, and that where it differs from the first hand of A and agrees with II it has not been emended, as Schanz held, from a MS of the family of II, but is an independent witness. A short treatise on the chief causes of textual errors is then given, with ample illustration from the MSS of Plato. He then takes up the subject of textual emendation, discussing in order the still doubtful passages of the Republic, the passages in which this text rests on emendations, the most important conjectures of Cobet, Madvig and others not received into the present text, and certain suggestions and recommendations of his own. The essay closes with some interesting remarks in the vein of Professor Jowett's Introductory Essay, though less extreme in tone, on the difficulties and dangers of textual criticism generally. Four appendices give, first a collation of the present text with Paris. A, second a list of the errors of the first hand in Paris. A with the source of their correction, third a correction of the errors and omissions in Bekker's collations of II and Ξ, and fourth a discussion of Cesena MS M by E. Rostagno. There is something disheartening in the exiguity of the outcome of all this toil, and one is tempted to repeat Professor Jowett's heretical dictum, that "such enquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer detain us from more important subjects." There is really not much to be done with the text of Plato. The game must be played strictly according to the rules, but when it is played out we feel that it was hardly worth the midnight oil. The text of this edition must have cost Professor Campbell a considerable portion of the leisure hours of the last two or three years. Yet, as he himself says at the close of his interesting, if discursive, essay: "Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the Republic as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato's philosophy would remain uninjured."

Of the twelve passages which Professor Campbell regards as still open to suspicion (vol. II, p. 115), only two affect the sense even slightly. 387 C φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς οἶται, for which our editors read ὡς οἶόν τε (which they refer to *q*, and the correction of Par. A by *q*, not to Par. A, as hitherto), rejecting Hermann's more vigorous δὲ ἔτη and not venturing to insert in the text L. C.'s suggestion, ὡς ἐτεά. In IX 581 E, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, there is no real difficulty if we accept, with nearly all editors, Graser's τί οἰώμεθα and place interrogation-points after *μανθάνοντα* and *πόρρω*. Professor Jowett would retain *ποιώμεθα* and take the words τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω as ironical. I do not care to try to convert any one whose perceptions of Greek style do not tell him that this is impossible. Professor Campbell's suggestion, τῆς ἀληθινῆς, of which he thinks ἡδονῆς a substituted gloss, does not affect the meaning and supplies a plausible remedy for the seemingly objectionable repetition of ἡδονῆς. But it is, I think, unnecessary. The Platonic philosopher thinks that sensual pleasures are no pleasures. Cf. Philebus 44 C ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοῆτευμα οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι. The difficulties in 388 E, 359 C, 567 E, 590 D, 603 C, 615 C, are too trifling for further debate. 439 E ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ is certainly awkward. L. C.'s suggestion, οὐ πιστεύω τούτῳ, with changed reference of τούτῳ, equally so. 533 E ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐξιν σαφηνεῖα ὁ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ is impossible, and the ingenuity is wasted that is spent upon it in the commentary to this result: "An expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition that of which it speaks as existing in the mind." All we want is the thought of Charmides 163 D ὁ λόγος δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοῖνομα ὁ τι ἂν λέγῃς, and that is given by the only tolerable text yet proposed, that of Hermann: ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐξω σαφηνεῖαν ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ (ἀρκέσει), which is ignored by our editors and which is indeed too remote from the MSS to be susceptible of proof. In 562 B the unwarranted ὑπερπλοῦτος, which B. J. defends *more suo*, may be emended by deleting ὑπερ or by L. C.'s plausible suggestion, πον πλούτος. In 568 D, L. C.'s suggestion, πωλουμένων, is as easy a way as any of securing the required meaning which grammar forbids us to extract from ἀποδομένων.

Of the 29 passages in which the present text relies on conjectures by various hands, none affects the sense except possibly the obvious *παισιν* for *πᾶσιν* (494 B and 431 C), Schneider's palmary καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα for καὶ ἐτι μάλιστα, 554 A, Graser's τί οἰώμεθα, 581 D, Vermehren's χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων, which restores concinnity in 401 E, and L. C.'s διὰ τοῦ bis, 440 C, for διὰ τὸ, an emendation which was pencilled on the margin of my Teubner text some years ago. The others restore a paragoge *ν* or a dropped *αν* or an *iota* subscript, or smooth out an anacoluthon. Professor Campbell himself suggests some fifteen emendations in addition to the one admitted to the text (vol. II, p. 123). Three or four of these have already been considered. Of the others the most important are the (in the context) cacophonous ἀξίως, 496 A, for ἀξιον, which is better omitted altogether, with Hermann; ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τῶν τοῦ σώματος for εἶναι, 518 D, which is clever and would commend itself but for a lingering doubt whether the phrase had not a half-humorous suggestion in Plato's usage; and ἡ οὐκ (sic *g*) . . . ἀλλοίαν τε [Stallb. for τοι] φήσεις, 500 A. It is unnecessary to follow Professor Campbell in his recension of the superfluous emendations of

Cobet, Madvig and others not admitted into the text. The man who prints an emendation that is not required but is merely possible Greek in the context is a thief of our time and should be suppressed by a conspiracy of silence. I could wish, however, that our editors had followed Hermann in admitting Nägelsbach's *ἐτι ἀδυναμία*, supported by a quotation from Iamblichus, for *ἐπ' ἀδυναμία* in 532 B C. *ἐπ' ἀδυναμία βλέπειν* 'to look powerlessly,' i. e. 'to be without the power to see,' as our editors construe, after Schneider, makes large demands on our faith in the flexibility of Greek idiom, and Stallbaum's "bei dem Unvermögen zu sehen" is not much better. Moreover, the *ἐτι* adds a touch that is needed; cf. 516 A *πρῶτον μὲν*, etc. For the rest, all this matter, with much besides, is conscientiously repeated in the commentary, though exhaustiveness is after all not attained, and many useful readings recorded in Stallbaum or Hermann are ignored. I have noted the following points, which might (without much profit) be indefinitely added to. In 332 E no notice is taken of the plausible *προπολεμεῖν* approved by Ast and Stephanus. In 365 B *ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ*, which has sufficient MS authority, is better than *ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ*. The thought is: 'I shall profit nothing from *being* just unless I also seem' rather than 'I shall profit nothing from being just (even) if I seem the opposite.' What our editors mean by saying that *ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ* is more idiomatic I cannot guess. In 365 D *καὶ (οὐδ' Jowett and Campbell) ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν*, I think the consensus of the MSS can be defended, despite the necessity for a negative that nearly all editors have felt here. The argument of the entire passage runs: There exist (1) political clubs *ἐπὶ τὸ λανθάνειν* and (2) teachers of persuasion who will enable us to evade punishment if detected. But, you will say, we cannot (1) elude or (2) constrain the gods. The answer is (transferring the question to the higher sphere), as for gods, perhaps (1) they do not exist or are careless of mankind, or (2) can be persuaded or bought off by prayers and ceremonies. Accordingly, we must either (1) try to escape detection, as on the previous supposition, before the gods were introduced into the argument, or (2) invoke priests and hierophants as in the former case teachers of the art of persuasion. The logic of *καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν* is loose, but it is quite as good as that of *εἰ μὴ εἰσὶν* as an answer to *θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν δυνατόν*, and there is no need of reading *οὐδ', οὐκ οὖν, τί οὐ ἀμελητέον*. The *καὶ* of *καὶ ἡμῖν* indicates an illogical but perfectly natural antithesis between 'us' on the present supposition and the members of the political clubs above. In 378 D our editors follow Baiter in punctuating after *γραυσί*. The antithesis thus secured between *παιδία εὐθὺς* and *πρεσβυτέρους γιγνομένους* (*ἀν γενομένοις*?) favors this. The awkwardness of the four times repeated ambiguous *καὶ*, and the difficulty of the dative with *λογοποιεῖν* and the emphasis thus lost of the triplet *καὶ γέρονσι καὶ γραυσὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέρους γιγνομένους*, are against it. 397 A, L. C. accepts Madvig's (Schneider's?) *μυμήσεται* for *διηγῆσεται*, *adversante* B. J., but *διηγῆσεται* seems to be required by the balance of the sentence: *πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγῆσεται καὶ . . . οἴσεται ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι*. 442 C *σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ μικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ' ἥρχει τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν ἔχον αὐτὸ κάκεινο*, etc. Our editors seem to feel no difficulty in the *τῷ δ*, etc., nor do they note the omission of *τῷ* by Par. K and Mon. A simple remedy would be to omit the *τῷ* before *δ* and insert it after *παρήγγελλεν*, reading *τῷ ἐχέειν*. In 451 E, in

reading ὥστε εὖ (for οὐ) με παραμυθεῖ, our editors, here as elsewhere, overestimate the possibilities of Socratic irony. 500 A. In arguing against the repetition of ἀλλοίαν in a different sense, our editors should not have ignored the reading of M, ἀλλ' οἶαν (recorded, it is true, in the footnotes to the text), which, with the pointing and interrogation-marks of Hermann, yields a much more vivacious and idiomatic text than that adopted here. Moreover, ἀλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι fits the defiant οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ above much better if taken in the sense 'contradict us' than in the sense 'change their reply.' In 521 C Hermann's οὔσα ἐπ' ἀνόδοις (after Iamblichus) is the only readable idiomatic text here. Only desperate ingenuity can construe the others. In 606 C the text or footnotes should indicate Hermann's δῆ (for δὲ), which the commentary rightly prefers.

The most notable feature of the commentary is the excellence of its literary form. The translations given are felicitous and the expression is always just and vigorous, whether in the paraphrase of an idiom, the elucidation of the exact force of a particle or the discrimination of Platonic synonyms. Very interesting, too, are the little sermonizing, reflective paragraphs, in the style of the essays that accompany Jowett's Plato, scattered here and there throughout the notes. They are the kind of remark that a judicious teacher would wish to be able to address to his class in occasional digressions, by way of relief to the stricter interpretation of the text. One may call attention especially to the observations on casuistry, p. 12, on Plato as a political economist, p. 85, on psychology, p. 202, on ridicule as the test of truth, p. 217, on international law, p. 244, on metaphysics, p. 268, on the philosopher in the world, p. 287. These little essays are full of quoted or quotable things, as for example, p. 30: "Mankind are rightly jealous of their principles being reduced to the level of their practice"; p. 174: "The habit of mind which has been acquired in making necessary distinctions may go on to make unnecessary ones"; p. 245: "A great nation's little wars are commonly the least creditable part of her history"; p. 281: "There are two classes not marked in the vocabulary of party and found in all parties—the inferior minds and the superior."

These qualities lend the commentary an educational usefulness in excess of its strictly scientific value. In a complete commentary on the Republic we should look, after the text had been settled and the few antiquarian or historical allusions explained, first for notes on the particles, on Platonic synonyms and idioms, and for illustration of the thought and language from other Platonic dialogues—and all this we find admirably done here. But we should also demand illuminating philosophic interpretation of the thought in relation to Plato's system as a whole and to similar modern speculations, and erudite illustration of the influence of the Republic on later Greek literature, and here we should be disappointed. The conscientiously explicit notes on the particles in the earlier books studied in connection with the corresponding sections of Professor Campbell's essay would almost enable the student to dispense with a teacher. The delicate implications of the various uses of ἀλλά, the use of δῆ or καὶ δῆ καί in the special application of a rule, the resumptive δ' οὖν, the μέντοι of meditative transition or challenged assent to an admitted fact affecting the argument, the ἀρα of disclaimed responsibility, and

other familiar friends are described with a precision somewhat surprising to the reader of Jowett's translations.

It is perhaps hypercritical to miss notes on the difference between *οὐ δῆτα* and *οὐ δῆπου*, on the *αὖ* of impatience or exasperation, 393 D, on the *οὖν* of reluctant concession, 440 A, on *ἄρα* = 'if it so be that,' 361 A, on the ironical *δῆ*, 561 B, 562 E, on the frequent intensifying use of *οὐδέ* *ne—quidem* 'neither,' on the *καί* of 387 D, on the slight touch of the oratorical style in the *καίτοι* of 360 C, on the *δῆ* that calls attention to an etymology in 365 A.

The shading of Platonic synonyms and the eulogistic or dyslogistic suggestions with which his words are charged are carefully noted; e. g. *ὑμνεῖν* 329 B, *ὄρος* 331 D, *οἰομένον* 336 A, *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* 336 B, *δεινός* 337 A, *ἀναπέφονται* 350 B, *εὐχερῶς* 364 A, *φορτικῶς* 367 A, *σκυτοτόμον* 369 D, *χορτάζειν* 372 D, *κομφός* 376 A, *συχνός* 376 D, *δοκοῦντες* 420 A, *καλινδείσθαι* 479 D, *κάθηρται* 559 D, *δγκον* 373 B, *λεγομένων* 431 C.

The notes also serve as admirable stage-directions to the comic by-play of the dialogue. Cf. especially 338 C, 341 A B, 348 C, 351 C. And the mechanism for the dialogue and the countless minor felicities of Plato's style are analyzed with fine literary sense and not infrequently illustrated by pertinent parallels, especially from Shakspeare.

Positive errors of interpretation are few and slight. The notes occasionally call attention to trifling mistakes in the last edition of Jowett's translation. A number of corrections to that translation made in this Journal (XIII 364 foll.) seem to have been silently accepted; e. g. in 464 E *ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖα τιθέντες*, formerly rendered "we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity," and in A. J. P., loc. cit., "compelling them (by the indirect effect of our legislation) to develop their muscle" is now interpreted "in this way we shall oblige them to keep themselves in condition." In 473 A no explicit notice is taken of the correction in A. J. P. of the very confused translation, but our phrase ad loc.: "Plato is inverting the familiar Greek antithesis of word and deed and challenging the Democritean *Λόγος ἔργου σκῆ*," appears in the note: "*κἂν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ*" i. e. though it may seem an inversion of the recognized opposition between *λόγος* and *ἔργον*." So at 498 A the criticism in A. J. P.: "The point is not that they are frightened away, but that they wrongly begin with the hardest part of the subject," is virtually accepted in the note: "That is to say the study of Philosophy as at present pursued begins too early at the wrong end and ends too soon." In 525 B the structure of the sentence is now correctly given, in accordance with the criticism in A. J. P. The rendering of *ἢ μῆδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι* "and therefore he must be an arithmetician" has been changed to "because without emerging, etc., he can never become an arithmetician." The true force of *λογιστικῶ* ('an adept in the calculations of the higher reason') is still ignored. Plato is playing with the double meaning of *λογιστικός*. It is a most lame and impotent conclusion to affirm that the philosopher must study arithmetic or he can never become an arithmetician. In 597 C our suggestion that *τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς* is the dative of the measure of excess is given as an alternative construction. It is the only one allowed by the context. In 581 C our correction of *λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα* "we may begin by assuming" to "the three primary classes," etc., is adopted. In 607 A our interpretation of *τοῦ ἀεὶ δόξαντος*, etc.,

as prospective, i. e. "the rule that the common reason shall from time to time have pronounced to be the best" is given as an alternative version in the form "that reason which from time to time appears best to the majority." It is the only possible rendering. In 611 B our reference of *ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχὴ* to the apparent complexity of the soul rather than to its demonstrated immortality is preferred by L. C. as an alternative interpretation. The notes on *δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς* 500 D, on *πολιτικὴν γε* 430 C, and on *ὡς πλῆθει* 389 D embody the substance of our remarks in A. J. P. XIII 3, p. 362.

Of what seem to me reaffirmations of errors the following may be noted. In 341 C *οὐδὲν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα* is rendered by L. C. (apparently) "though here again you are nobody, i. e. with as little effect as ever," *καὶ ταῦτα* being thus taken in antithesis to former occasions when Thrasymachus attempted the same game. A note signed B. J. substantially repeats the rendering of the translation "and you failed" in the form "although you make a fool of yourself at that too," i. e. at cheating Thrasymachus as you would also have done at shaving a lion. But the obvious meaning to my mind is: "and you did attempt it, and that too though you are a thing of naught." Compare the absolute use of *οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι* in Anterast. 134 C, and the idiomatic *καὶ ταῦτα οὖσαν* "and that too though it exists" of Kleitophon 408 E. In 344 E the editors persist in rendering *ἤτοι* "or rather" instead of "or else." It is a trifling matter, but the evidence is against them. The word occurs again in 400 C *ἤτοι ξυναμφοτέρων τι*, and is there rendered by the editors themselves "or *perhaps* the combined effect of both," and in 433 A *τοῦτό ἐστιν ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἤτοι τοῦτον τι εἶδος ἢ δικαιοσύνη*, where they render "this or rather some form of this is justice." But Jowett's translation reads "now justice is this principle or a part of it," and that is the most natural version, in view of the tentative, undogmatic tone of the paragraph. In the passage in question (344 E) our editors err in dropping the interrogation-point after *ἔχειν*. Thrasymachus says sullenly: "Do I think otherwise?" (of the importance of the issue). To which Socrates replies: "you appear to, or else to care nothing for us." There is nothing in the context to justify "or rather."

I am loth to renew the discussion of the image of the mutinous ship's crew in 488 E. As I have said already, "the text here will always be doubtful, . . . but it is certain that it is the true pilot, not the mob, who doubts the possibility of combining the pilot's art with the politician's knack of seizing the helm, whether other people like it or not." Our editors' rendering makes the thought run: (1) They (the mob of sailors) call the man who is clever at seizing the helm the true pilot. (2) They do not know that the true pilot must study navigation, (3) but to get the helm into one's hands in defiance of opposition is an art and study which they imagine to be irreconcilable with the acquisition of the science of navigation. The real Platonic sequence of thought is: (1) They call the grasper of the helm the true pilot. (2) They do not know that the true pilot must devote himself to the study of navigation, and (3) that he does not believe that *there is any art of seizing the helm*, or practice of it, whose acquisition is compatible with mastery of the true pilot's art. In the italicized words I have imperfectly indicated a subtlety of the original generally missed. Plato chooses a form of expression which, while explicitly denying the compatibility of the helm-seizing (the politician's) with

the pilot's (the statesman's) art, hints that the former is no art at all. This is effected by the isolated position of *μήτε τέχνην τούτου*, 488 E; cf. 493 B and especially 518 D with Gorgias 462 B.

In 534 A *τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἐκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἔωμεν*, the precise point is, I think, still missed by the version "the exact proportion to each other of the things to which these terms apply, and the division of the spheres of opinion and reason severally." The *δοξαστόν* and *νοητόν* are the objective realities corresponding to *δόξα* and *νοῦς*. Plato proposes to pass over the quadripartite division of them, corresponding to the division already indicated of the subjective faculties. *ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα* then means not "the things to which these terms apply," but the objective correlates of these subjective faculties (cf. 477 D, 480 A). One reason for passing them over, as I have shown more fully elsewhere, is that there is no objective correlate for *διάνοια*. In 574 C *Σμικρά γ' ἔφη κακὰ λέγεις ἐὰν ὀλίγοι ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι*, the rendering of the translation, "a small catalogue of evils even if the perpetrators of them are few in number," is ingeniously defended by the assumption that *σμικρά* is intended ironically, but that it is taken up seriously in Socrates' reply: *τὰ γὰρ σμικρὰ κτλ.* But the 'even' is not in the text, and it is a waste of ingenuity to read it in.

In other difficult or doubtful passages the editors often resort to the device of alternative renderings, so much employed in Professor Campbell's Sophocles, and not infrequently argue against each other in little polemical paragraphs signed L. C. or B. J. Thus in 331 C for *ἀπλῶς οὕτως* we have our choice of "thus absolutely" and "just absolutely." The former is preferable. In 333 E they read *λαθεῖν ἐμποῦνσαι*, rejecting Schneider's *ἐμπούσας*, and the piety of Professor Campbell has preserved a note of Professor Jowett objecting to the impression "that *λαθεῖν νόσον* 'to dodge a disease' is not good Greek." This, like the utterance at 412 D, "that it is not probable that *δταν* is ever followed by the optative mood," has a purely biographical interest. In 334 D *ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων* the rendering of the translation, "many a man who is ignorant of human nature" suits the context and Platonic usage better than that of the notes: "that is to say those of mankind who are in error."

In 339 E *ἀρα τότε ὧ σοφώτατε*, etc., L. C. joins *αὐτὸ* with *δικαίον*, after Ast and Madvig. B. J. puts a comma after *οὕτως*, making *αὐτὸ* indefinite. The former would be more idiomatic and Platonic if Socrates were making the point for the first time. But he is repeating it for Thrasymachus' unwilling comprehension, and *οὕτως* pauses to recall the previous statement at the beginning of 339 D; cf. 360 A *καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν* of a verification. In 348 E *τοῦτο ἤδη στερεώτερον* the second version, "this is harder to make an impression upon," is better than the first, "this new position is firmer," etc. *στερεός* connotes stubbornness, and Thrasymachus' position is not really firmer in the opinion of Socrates, but only harder to deal with dialectically. In 371 A the alternative version of *ὧν ἂν δέωνται* 'whatever the things may be that they require' is obviously wrong and should be suppressed. In 377 B and 378 A *ῥαδίως οὕτω* means (1) "thus lightly," not (2) "lightly as is now commonly done, though the second meaning may be injured."

In 387 E the words *ἰσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι* refer to the aesthetic effects of the poetry, whose moral teachings are deprecated, as proved by 390 A. It is

overrefining to see an allusion to the moralizing influence of the fear of the last judgment, as is suggested also in the essays, vol. II, p. 20. In 395 B the emphatic "or else" meaning of ἢ would assume a linguistically impossible ellipsis. 395 D ἀνδρί, obviously her husband, not a man.

397 B πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν. L. C. argues at length for the interpretation πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν, sc. χορὴν, but is unable to cite a parallel. It is by no means certain that Plato was himself distinctly conscious of the ellipsis in such a phrase. The editors diverge widely on the syntax of the loose sentence 407 D. L. C. seems right in taking τὰ—σώματα in pendent construction similar to τοὺς μὲν above. But B. J. is right in making μὴ οἶσθαι δεῖν depend on φῶμεν. καταδείξαι ἱατρικὴν . . . μὴ οἶσθαι δεῖν would be too harsh. The editors do not remark on the necessity of reserving the τε in φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς for προστάττειν.

In 411 C εὐωχῆται εὐ μάλα is not to be taken "fare sumptuously," but rather with L. C. "if he take his fill of it."

In 415 B refer αὐτοῖς to ἐκγόνους and τούτων to the various metals, with B. J.

422 B. The meaning "perhaps" for πολλάκις is out of place here, and is rendered extremely improbable by the distance of πολλάκις from εἰ and the absence of a warning ἄρα.

425 B. L. C.'s suggestion that κατακλίσεις should be taken actively is to be approved. In 437 C it will be hard to find a parallel for ἐπινεύειν . . . πρὸς αὐτὴν in the alternative sense suggested: "beckon them with a nod towards herself." It obviously refers to the soul's internal dialogue.

458 A. It is more idiomatic to construe καὶ with ὕστερον, with L. C.

472 C. B. J. is right in arguing against L. C. that εἰ γένοιτο is not seriously inconsistent with τούτου ἔνεκα, infra. The εἰ γένοιτο is the necessary accompaniment of οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, and does not prejudge the question of the probability of actual realization.

478 C μὴ ὄν γε. L. C. is right in pressing γε and rendering "not-being since non-existent."

494 D τῶν λόγων is general—"reason," "dialectic." In 484 A the suggestion is hazarded that αὐτοῖς is to be supplied and that διεξελλθόντος is to be taken transitively, "which has discussed them."

503 C. The second interpretation is the only admissible one. νεανικοὶ and μεγαλοπρεπεῖς, in spite of their position, belong with μνήμονες and ὀξεῖς as constituents of the impetuous, ardent temperament opposed to the κόσμιοι. Plato's uniform usage leaves no doubt on this point.

506 A. B. J. is right in interpreting πρότερον "before he sees how they are good." Plato is not arguing that the ideal statesman must know the good before others, but that he must know the good before he can understand the essential nature of justice and the virtues.

507 E. L. C. is right in supplying παραγενομένου with τινός.

554 C. B. J.'s alternative, "by some virtuous restraint which he puts upon himself," is obviously mistaken.

558 A. (2) "the meekness of some of the condemned" is preferable.

560 B. (2) is right.

563 C γίγνονται; there is no need of supplying ἐλεύθεροι, or of supposing a word dropped (L. C.), or of construing γίγνονται with εἰθισμένοι. The predicate

with γίγνονται is οἰαίπερ, the τε δὲ is loose conversational repetition of τε above, and εἰθισμένοι, etc., is loose expexegetic apposition to οἰαίπερ, though of course literally inapplicable to δέσποιναι. This sounds complicated, but is simple enough if we follow Plato's toying with the proverb in the order of the Greek.

A few miscellaneous observations may be added here.

440 D νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων is rendered "does not desist from noble efforts," and so Stallbaum: "generoso opere." τῶν γενναίων means "in the case of the truly noble" and is to be taken with θυμός "understood." It is one of the characteristic parenthetic Platonic suggestions of the class to which the statement is applicable, and corresponds in this function to ὅσῳ ἂν γενναί-ότερος ᾗ above. νικᾷ is awkward, and no good remedy has been suggested. φιλονεικεῖ is obvious, but not very probable.

465 C κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες, etc. Why not take πένητες as subject of ἰσχυοῦσι, displaced to mark antithesis with πλουσίων?

469 A. It is surely misleading to say that τιθέναι is used absolutely for ἐς ταφὰς τιθέναι, though that is the meaning.

529 A οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες. Is not this simply "those who introduce their pupils to philosophic studies"? It seems to be so taken in L. and S., s. v. ἀνάγειν. For the tone of the passage cf. Protag. 319 D E.

In 573 D ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς κτλ. our editors say that ὧν is governed by ἔρως, "whatever things are the objects of the tyrant passion that lives within." Take ὧν rather with τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς as resumptive of αὐτοῖς above, and render: "feasts and carousals and revellings arise among them—among those, that is, all the concerns of whose souls are swayed by the tyrant ἔρως within." ὧν ἂν makes a class or limitation fittingly with αὐτοῖς. It cannot properly do so with τοιαῦτα πάντα, which is sufficiently explained by what precedes and needs no further definition. The thought is "revels, etc., arise among men of this sort whose souls are swayed by a ruling desire," not "revels arise and such things whatsoever they be the love of which," etc. The passage is unconsciously rendered rightly by Jowett in the translation: "Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul."

The problem of the 'number' is valiantly attacked by Professor Campbell, but no convincing solution is reached, and until this is done it seems idle to print more on the subject. The same may be said of Mr. Craigie's contributed note on the "order of Plato's enumeration of the planets in Rep. X 616 E ff." Nor is there anything especially new or significant in the brief discussions of Plato's banishment of the poets, unless it be the somewhat captious observation that in 472 B and in 501 ff. Plato talks of painters as copyists of the Idea, while in book X he speaks of them along with poets as mere copyists of the copy.

Of the quality of the commentary on the philosophic side, it is not needful to add much to the remarks already made on Professor Campbell's essays. Elaborate philosophic interpretation of the Platonic ontology was, as the surviving editor explicitly says, beyond the scope of the work. The drift of particular passages and the evolution of the argument from page to page are clearly indicated. But there is a deplorable tendency here and there (e. g. 379 B, 435 A, 477 A) to read Plato lessons in elementary logic which no man

ever needed less, and to measure and interpret him by inapplicable modern canons or fanciful analogies. For example, it is a bit of pedantry unworthy of our editors to label Plato's literary procedure in 427 D sqq. "the method of residues," and then solemnly demonstrate that it does not strictly conform to Mill's canons. And one hardly knows how to characterize the fantastic suggestion (505 D) that the argument that men may acquiesce in sham virtue but desire the reality of 'good' "is in some degree like that of Anselm and Descartes, that the highest perfection involves existence."

Again, the unity of the central argument is nowhere sufficiently emphasized, nor is there any clear appreciation of the art with which the thin strands of ethical, sociological and psychological argument are twisted into one. The few ontological passages are too strongly contrasted with the doctrine of the professedly ontological or metaphysical dialogues, and the significance of the Idea of Good in relation to the structure of the Republic, to Plato's thought as a whole and to modern ethics is missed.

These matters could be set forth adequately only in a continuous positive exposition such as I have attempted elsewhere. Here I will merely note a few isolated points by way of illustration of my meaning.

In 505 A, instead of references to 438 A, we should have been referred to Charmides 174 B C, Laches 199 D, Euthyd. 291-2, and in lieu of the remark "are all these meanings of 'good' the same?—would have been the question of Aristotle," it would have been more profitable to show that the keenest ethical writers of recent times, Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen, concur with Plato in the demand that all social and ethical conceptions be referred ultimately to some final ideal of 'good.' Much the same may be said of the vague note on 508 E: "The intense reality of all beauty and all truth, when seen according to the divine idea, is perhaps as near as we can come to the meaning of Plato."

509 A τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐξίω. Even if we grant that the phrase = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει in its first intention, it certainly carries with it the purely ethical connotation of the "habit of goodness."

516 A. The supposition that the moon and stars may symbolize the ideas of Being, Truth, Sameness, Difference, etc., is purely fantastic.

524 C διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν. The construction indicated by the version, "But with a view to clearing up this chaos of sense," is right. The philosophic note illustrating Plato's meaning by the theory of vision is a misconception of Plato's simplicity. The confusion of which Plato speaks is the apparent contradiction between sense-perception accepted as a complete unanalyzed whole, and the abstractions denoted by language. The problem of the modern theory of vision is to analyze out and discriminate the purely sensuous and the intellectual elements in sense-perception. We cannot properly speak of Plato's 'error' in relation to a problem which he did not contemplate at all and which was irrelevant to his main purpose.

530 B προβλήματα ἄρα, etc. The reference to Phaedo 97 D E is out of place. There Socrates yearns for an explanation of the order of the universe through beneficent design. Here he affirms that we must study the relations of quantity and force in abstractions, and not attempt to extract them by induction from their imperfect, concrete embodiments.

533 B. The statement that mathematics have a scientific basis only when referred to the Idea of Good is a half truth which is practically a falsehood. Plato's thought, as I have elsewhere shown, is: (1) All social and moral institutions can be understood only in their relation to an ultimate ideal of good. (2) They can be related to that ideal only by a mind disciplined in abstractions and the severest dialectic. (3) Mathematics affords the best preliminary discipline in abstractions, but is not the highest dialectic, because the mathematician cannot, like the dialectician, go behind his premises when required to do so, till ultimate acceptable postulates are reached. This conception of dialectic in no wise contradicts that of Philebus 58 A, that it deals with *ὅν* *qua* *ὅν* in Aristotle's language. (4) As applied to the material world, the Idea of Good is an ultimate *ἀρχή* only as faith sees it embodied in the beneficent designs of God. Its operation cannot be traced in detail, and it is not in this sense an essential part of the thought of the Republic.

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Geschichte des Plusquamperfekts im Lateinischen von Dr. H. BLASE. Giessen, 1894. Pp. 112.

The author, one of the collaborators upon the new historical grammar, is well and favorably known through his dissertation on conditional sentences and his admirable *Geschichte des Irrealis*. The present pamphlet deals with the pluperfect in both indicative and subjunctive. As to the indicative, the whole question, in Blase's opinion, has been confused rather than clarified by the introduction of the 'absolute' and 'relative' notions. The true question is, 'What is the relation of the pluperfect to its temporal environment?' Foth, in Böhmer's *Romanische Studien*, 1876, has shown from the Romance languages that the Latin pluperfect underwent a shifting of meaning. The indicative became a preterite in French, a conditional in Spanish, Portuguese and Provençal; the subjunctive became an imperfect. Foth's results are in the main correct, but his division of Latin verbs into two classes, in one of which the perfect, because of the meaning of the verb, acquires the force of a present, Blase thinks erroneous. He therefore examines the facts of usage in Plautus, with these results: (1) The plupf. in early Latin is often used in its proper sense when the past act to which it is related is not mentioned in the immediate context. (2) In about ten cases the perf. and the plupf. are coordinated; this may be explained by metrical convenience. (3) The plupf. is also used rhetorically in anticipation of an immediately following past tense. (4) There are no 'absolute' uses of the plupf. (5) Shifting occurs only with *fueram*, a) alone, b) with *aequom*, *par*, etc., c) with perf. pass. etc. In all these cases it is equivalent to *eram* or *fui*. This shift of tense-force is due to the combination of *fui* and *eram* (Combinationsausgleichung), while e. g. *dixi* and *dixebam* could not unite into *dixeram*. This explains the occurrence with *fueram* only.

In the classical Latin the usage widens to include a few cases of *habueram* and verbs meaning *can* and *ought*, perhaps under the influence of *aequom fuerat*. The rhetorical use (3 above) is common in Vergil and the historians.